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Abstract: Following the suggestion of modern egalitarians,
the model proposed by Alesina & Angeletos (2005) sets up a
fairness rule based on composition of equality, designated by
the weights of eﬀort and luck. However, empirical evidence for
a set of Latin American countries suggests that, unlike devel-
oped countries, these societies do not have a well-established
view about the role of merit on economic outcome. Therefore,
this paper proposes a theoretical framework based on a new
fairness rule, namely the perception that the country does not
oﬀer everyone with the same opportunities. The new parame-
terization leads to a unique and stable equilibrium, character-
ized by an intermediate level of taxation between the equilibria
of the “U.S.” and of “Europe”.
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11 Introduction
Social and income redistribution policies have increasingly become the focus
of attention of traditional governmental powers. For instance, in the 1960s,
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) allocated an average of 8% of their GDPs to transfers and social
spending. In the early 2000s this rate more than doubled, rising to 17%
(Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). In developing countries, especially in Latin
America, the situation is even more conﬂicting. According to the Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) data,1 social
spending was three times bigger, increasing from 7% between 1960 and 1998
to 21% of the GDP in the 2000s.
At ﬁrst, it was postulated that the change in the stance of governments
resulted from a higher demand for income equality. This assumption is sup-
ported by models such as those of Mirrlees (1971) and of Meltzer & Richard
(1981), in which government size is determined by a mechanism of resource
redistribution, such that the larger the asymmetry of income distribution
(income inequality), the stronger the redistributive policy.
Nonetheless, recent theoretical frameworks contest the direct association
between redistributive policies and income inequality. Instead, the result
of the economic policy is thought to indicate the social desire for fairness,
determined by the tradition of modern egalitarians (cf. Roemer, 1996, 1998),
that is: if the income is made up of two elements, one related to eﬀort and
one associated with luck,2 the stronger the belief that luck is a determinant
of income, the higher the demand for redistributive policies.3
This fairness rule is mainly illustrated by the comparison of the U.S. and
the European scenarios. The U.S. has a larger inequality than that of Euro
Zone countries (Gini coeﬃcients of 0.36 and 0.31, respectively). However,
Europe has a more progressive tax structure and a higher share of the gov-
ernment in the economy, by means of redistributive policies, social spending
proportionally to the GDP, among others.4 This is so because, even though
inequality is larger than that observed in Europe, economic outcome results
from eﬀort for 80% of U.S. citizens. Thus, there is no reason for redistribu-
tion. The opposite reasoning holds for Europeans, with a rate of 40%.5
1Available at http://www.eclac.org/.
2In which unworthy activities, corruption, among others are summarized.
3Studies such as those of Piketty (1995) and Cervellati, Esteban & Kranich (2004) and
Bénabou & Tirole (2006), as well as the empirical results obtained by Alesina, Gleaser &
Sacerdote (2001), conﬁrm this association.
4See further details in Alesina et al. (2001).
5The rates related to the belief that luck determines income are obtained from the
2The importance of the “perception of injustice–redistributive policy” ra-
tio for explaining the heterogeneous behavior of governments is demonstrated
by Alesina & Angeletos (2005) (henceforth AA). The theoretical framework
developed by AA posits that not only do the diﬀerent perceptions of injus-
tice inﬂuence redistributive policies, but that they steer economies towards
multiple equilibria. In other words, if a society believes that individual eﬀort
determines income, it will choose low redistribution and low taxes. Another
society which believes that luck, connections, and/or corruption determines
wealth, will choose high taxes.
Two characteristics of this model are: the goal of the central planner
to maximize the median voter’s welfare and the presence of a social fair-
ness weighting component, based on the eﬀort-luck association, in the utility
function of individuals. In other words, societies have a well-established
perception about the role of merit. This assumption is summarized by the
afore-mentioned “conﬂict” between U.S. and European judgments.
Nevertheless, what happens when the association between merit and fair-
ness fails? In a recent paper, Sen (2000) states that the social demand for
merit chieﬂy depends: i) on non-personiﬁcation of actions, i.e., most of the
results arising from merit are not associated with speciﬁc social groups; ii)
on the good performance of incentives, i.e., greater eﬀort eﬀectively produces
a larger reward, and; iii) on social aversion to inequality, indicating that
the mechanisms based on merit can be set aside if they cause larger income
inequality.
By taking these factors into account, it is possible to postulate that a
merit-based fairness rule might not suit an environment with large income
inequality, poor economic mobility and social unrest, for instance. In other
words, although it eﬃciently explains the behavior of developed countries,
the theoretical model of AA might not suit the reality of developing countries.
The empirical literature shows the diﬀerence across inequality, mobility
and important social discrepancies of Latin American countries compared to
developed ones (cf. Fields, 2001, Barros et al., 2009, among others). Hence,
the association between merit and fairness could be impaired, as pointed out
by Sen (2000), which would invalidate the theoretical explanation provided
in AA.
Therefore, this paper proposes a theoretical framework that is closer to
the reality of Latin American countries, suggesting a change in the theoretical
model of AA, with the inclusion of a new fairness rule.
The paper is organized into four sections, in addition to this introduction.
Section 2 presents empirical elements that justify the adoption of a new
World Values Survey. Further information on the datasets is shown in Appendix A1.
3fairness rule. Section 3 suggests a change in the original model of AA. Section
4 discusses the economic and political behaviors that support the demand
for social protection. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Justiﬁcation
The aim of this section is to provide some empirical evidence that contests a
merit-based fairness rule. A dataset for Latin American countries obtained
from the World Values Survey and from the LatinoBarómetro will be used.
2.1 Behavior of Latin American Countries
Several are the reasons for the diﬀerence in welfare across developed and Latin
American countries. For economic historians like La Escosura (2004, 2005),
an important factor can be found in the colonial past of Latin America. On
the other hand, Coatsworth (1993, 1998) draws attention to the institutional
role and to an environment that facilitates structuralist, ECLAC’s, and marx-
ist views, among others, in the post-World War II period. Moreover, most
of these countries remained under protectionist governmental actions for a
long time, with a low level of economic integration. In the political arena,
military dictatorships, arising from the cold war, and caudillo governments,
mainly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay are noteworthy.6
In summary, the association of these factors with inequality and mobility
indicators is not believed to prompt the establishment of an eﬀort-based
fairness rule. That is, it is postulated that Latin American countries have
their own fairness rule, unlike the eﬀort-luck weighting component observed
in the U.S. and European societies.
A way to check this hypothesis is by assuming that an individual has
a welfare loss associated with inequality. This argument is based on Bén-
abou & Tirole (2006) and can be captured through a regression, in which the
welfare arising from income redistribution is explained by a series of indi-
vidual covariables, including the afore-mentioned belief that luck determines
income.
As individual welfare is a latent variable (Y ∗), the following structure is
suggested: Y ∗ = X′θ+u, where X represents the covariables, θ is the vector
of parameters and u ∼ N(0,1). Let us consider an indicator variable Y =
I{Y ∗>0}, which assumes value 1 if the redistribution has a positive inﬂuence
on welfare (Y ∗ > 0), i.e., −u < X′θ and 0 otherwise.
6Detailed information about the Latin American economic history can be found in
Bulmer-Thomas (2003).
4In this case, the variable Y , which stands for the interest in a broader
level of fairness, is represented by individual political orientation. Just as
in Alesina et al. (2001), individuals who view themselves as leftists tend to
be more prone to redistributive policies and to governmental intervention;
therefore, they are designated by Y = 1. In other words, their welfare
functions are negatively aﬀected by inequality. Again, the information was
obtained from the World Values Survey. The results for the Probit regression
for Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, the USA and Germany are displayed in
Table 1.
5Table 1: Political Orientation and the Eﬀect of Belief in Luck on Income: Selected Countries
Brazil Chile Uruguay Mexico USA Germany
Belief in Luck 0.0762 0.0008 -0.1318 -0.0461 0.1845* 0.2626*
Income -0.0280 -0.0006 -0.0177 -0.0583* 0.0113 -0.0022
Schooling 0.0581* 0.0334 0.1060* -0.0080 0.0127# 0.1066*
City size 0.0678* 0.1809 0.0878* 0.0811* 0.0012 0.0326*
Married 0.0789 0.0324 -0.0074 -0.2088* -0.1680 0.0417
Number of children 0.0116 -0.0312 0.0613# 0.0118 −0.0552† 0.0265
Sex 0.0792 0.2276# 0.0523 0.0123 0.0114 -0.1011
Age group 18-24 0.6564* 0.0031 0.6789* 0.3715 0.3630† -0.1365
Age group 25-34 0.5470* 0.1575 0.5961* 0.2847 0.2516 -0.1757
Age group 35-44 0.4882* 0.0144 0.5385* 0.2942 0.5776* -0.0358
Age group 45-54 0.4012* 0.1479 0.3094# 0.2132 0.5358* 0.0527
Age group 55-64 0.3564# -0.1813 -0.0203 -0.0073 0.4727* 0.0252
Constant -1.9640* −2.1460# -2.1330* -1.1034* -1.2753* -1.1186*
Pseudo R2 0.0276 0.0216 0.0828 0.0385 0.0364 0.0398
Observations 1.408 778 896 1.434 1.129 1.830
Note: *p < 0.01, #p < 0.05 e †p < 0.10.
6In contrast with the results obtained by Alesina et al. (2001) and with the
inferences for the U.S. and Germany, the estimates for Latin American coun-
tries indicate that the perception of unfairness based on merit does not have
an impact on individual welfare. That is, although most inhabitants of these
countries regard luck as a key factor for individual economic results (average
of 48%), it does not interfere with their preferences for redistribution.
After these considerations, the study can follow two paths. The ﬁrst
one consists in assuming that the weight of injustice of these societies is
null, reducing the model of AA to that of Meltzer & Richard (1981). That
is, by assuming that the existing asymmetry between the income of mean
and median voters is the single relevant factor for an optimal policy. The
second one consists in contesting the adopted fairness rule since, based on the
theoretical arguments advocated by Bénabou & Tirole (2006), the hypothesis
of the absence of fairness rules in these societies is too unrealistic.
Following the second path, we should ask: how do Latin Americans view
merit? The ﬁrst evidence is provided by LatinoBarómetro data (shown in
detail in Appendix A1), which is similar to the World Values Survey, but
applied only to Latin American countries. The selected question asks about
wage diﬀerences between two workers:
“Two individuals, of the same age, work as computer program-
mers and carry out the same activities. One of them earns
better than the other, but he is faster, more eﬃcient and more
reliable. In your opinion, do you think it is fair that one pro-
grammer earns better than the other?”
Note that the situation clearly involves a rational choice as to the level
of eﬀort. Put diﬀerently, the wage diﬀerence seen according to the fairness
rule established by AA is perfectly justiﬁable. However, Latin Americans do
not think like that, given that 47% of respondents consider this diﬀerence to
be unfair. In Venezuela, for example, this rate is as high as 60%. The lowest
rate is observed in Paraguay, 32%. while in Brazil and Mexico this rate is
46% and 49%, respectively.
A second question, about the level of poverty, was asked:
“There are diﬀerent opinions about the causes of poverty in
your country. Some say that the poor exist because they do not
strive enough to improve their living conditions; some say that
the poor exist owing to circumstances beyond their control.
Which of these opinions is closest to yours”
7The answers are even more startling. For 64% of Latin Americans,
poverty stems from circumstances rather than from “laziness.” This belief
is less common in Honduras (47%), but more prevalent in Brazil (81%), Ar-
gentina (81%) and Uruguay (77%).
As the measure of inequality in AA divides income into two components,
eﬀort and luck, these rates should correspond to the eﬀect of luck on income.
Nonetheless, World Values Survey data indicate that luck as a determining
factor for income among Latin American countries is much less common than
the belief that poverty is circumstantial.
Apparently, Latin Americans are worried about inequality as a whole
and not only about luck or circumstances (composition). This conclusion is
corroborated by the weighting of factors related to social conﬂicts. Latino-
Barómetro data show that among possible social conﬂicts such as between
men and women, employed and unemployed, employers and employees, young
and old, among others, the major conﬂict seems to be between “the poor and
the rich.” Eighty-ﬁve percent of the respondents believe in the existence of
such conﬂict.
Therefore, the purpose here is to verify the relationship between social
spending and a merit-free fairness measure. To do that, recent data on social
spending in Latin America.7 in addition to LatinoBarómetro data. The
selected fairness indicator should answer the following question:
“There are diﬀerent opinions about equal opportunities in this
country. Some people say that the economic system provides
everyone with equal opportunities; while some say that not
everyone is given the same opportunities to climb the ladder
out of poverty. Which of these opinions is closest to yours?”
The percentage of people who believe in the second hypothesis is used
as proxy for the new fairness rule. Note that the individual is asked about
the opportunities given to everyone and not only to a group of people who
deserve them. Figure 1 shows a positive relationship across the variables of
interest. The ﬁtted straight line (full line) describes the linear relationship for
all sampled countries. The dotted line describes the same relationship, but
Venezuela is left out, as it is an outlier. The regression in Table 2 conﬁrms
these results.8
7Information obtained from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC). The mean expenditure values for the 2000s were taken into account.
8The regression is robust against outliers, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.






































































Figure 1: Relationship between Social Spending in % of GDP and the Per-
centage of Those who Believe that the Country does not Oﬀer Equal Oppor-
tunities.
Following the logic of the empirical model in Table 1, regressions are
performed and the redistributive desire (political orientation) is explained
by the new fairness rule and by a set of covariates.9 Regressions for Brazil,
Chile, Uruguay and Mexico are shown.
Table 3 results indicate that the relationship between the belief in the
existence of unequal opportunities and redistributive desire is relevant for the
group of Latin American countries. Income, Schooling, Sex and Age Group
covariates turned out to be signiﬁcant. The dummies for Civil Servants and
for Married individuals were not signiﬁcant. The regressions for the selected
countries demonstrate that the new fairness rule has a direct relationship
with redistributive desire (individual welfare). However, the rule is not valid
for Mexico.10
This evidence leads to an important challenge: to devise a theoretical
model that explains the particular behavior of developing countries. There-
9There is a diﬀerence between the covariates of Tables 1 and 2. This is due to the fact
that the regressions were estimated based on two diﬀerent datasets.
10Actually, 5 of 17 countries do not ﬁt into the new fairness rule, namely Bolivia, Costa
Rica, Guatemala, Mexico and Paraguay.
9Table 2: Eﬀect of the Belief in Unequal Opportunities on Social Spending
Coeﬃcients Standard Deviations
Belief in Unequal Opportunities 0.3207† 0.1579
Gini -0.4506 0.3580




Note: †p < 0.10.
fore, a change in the fairness rule introduced in the theoretical model of AA
is proposed: individual welfare will be aﬀected by the perception of fairness
involving inequality as a whole rather than its composition. The resultant
optimal policy, as well as the equilibrium relationships of the new model, are
presented in the subsequent section.
10Table 3: Political Orientation and Belief in Unequal Opportunities: Selected Countries
All Brazil Chile Uruguay Mexico
Belief in Unequal Opportunities 0.1695* 0.2535# 0.3073# 0.4739* -0.0764
Income 0.0825* 0.1054 -0.2148* -0.0473 0.1075#
Schooling 0.0444* 0.1060* 0.0031 0.0127# 0.0085
Civil Servants 0.0190 0.2431 0.2897 0.0395 0.2242
Married 0.0034 0.0138 -0.1492 0.1062 -0.2272#
Sex 0.0402† 0.1264 0.1617 0.1288 0.0094
Age group 18-24 0.2235* 0.6273* -0.3394 0.5771* 0.0569
Age group 25-34 0.2153* 0.4860* -0.0707 0.4967* 0.1009
Age group 35-44 0.1493* 0.4618* 0.1593 0.3964* -0.1447
Age group 45-54 0.1236* 0.2136 0.1191 0.3988* -0.0826
Constant -0.2978* -0.9913* -0.2179 -0.7823* -0.0477
Pseudo R2 0.0100 0.0551 0.0332 0.0714 0.0184
Observations 14.556 824 457 1.129 943
Note: *p < 0.01. #p < 0.05 e †p < 0.10.
1
13 Theoretical Model
Base. Let us consider a static economy with a large number of agents indexed
by i ∈ [0,1]. Individuals live in two periods and, in each one, they engage in
some productive activity, such as physical or human capital accumulation,
labor supply, entrepreunership, among others. Tax and redistributive policies
are set in the middle of their lives.
Income, redistributive policy and budgeting. Pre-tax life-cycle income,
yi (henceforth, pretax income), is deﬁned by a combination of talent (Ai), of
investment during the ﬁrst period of life (ki), of eﬀort during the second
period of life (ei) and of “noise” (ηi):
yi = Ai[αki + (1 − α)ei] + ηi. [3.1]
Where α ∈ (0,1) is a constant that represents income loss from the distor-
tionary eﬀect of taxes. Ai and ηi are i.i.d. (independently and identically
distributed) variables across i′s. The noise variable represents luck and un-
worthy activities such as corruption, rent seeking, political subversion, among
others.
The government levies a ﬁxed tax on income (ﬂat-rate tax), and adopts a
redistributive policy lump-sum, such that the budget of individual i is given
by:11
ci = (1 − τ)yi + G, [3.2]
where G = τ¯ y, is ¯ y ≡
R
i yi, i.e., the average income of the population. Thus,
ci can be interpreted as consumption or as the income available after the
adoption of tax (τ) and redistribution (G) policies.
Preferences. Individual preferences are represented by
Ui = ui − γΩ, [3.3]
where ui is the utility derived from the choices related to consumption, in-
vestment and eﬀort, that is:





i + (1 − α)e
2
i]. [3.4]
11A linear structure is assumed, as the government does not have any information about
individual variables related to talent, eﬀort and human and ﬁxed capital investments.
12In this case, βi is an i.i.d. variable that represents delayed consumption.
Low βi values denote impatience or laziness. On the other hand, high values
denote love for work.
Fairness. The second part of equation (3.3) denotes the disutility caused
by the level of social unfairness (Ω), captured by parameter γ ≥ 0. In brief,
γ represents the demand for social justice. Therefore, the original model of
AA is modiﬁed. Instead of contemplating only eﬀort and luck, the level of
unfairness is given by:
Ω = [φΩ1 + (1 − φ)Ω2].
If φ = 1, the model will be identical with that developed by AA. In other
words, society has a fairness rule based on the eﬀort-luck component. If




(ui − ¯ u)
2, [3.5]
where ¯ u represents the average level of utility, i.e., that which results from
the mean values of ci, ki and ei.
The results for a φ = 1 are well-known in the literature. AA demonstrated
that, in this parameterization, the model has multiple equilibria, two of which
are stable. The ﬁrst one denotes the U.S. reality, with low taxes, and the
second one, with a larger tax burden, represents the European reality. In
what follows we present the results for φ = 0. That is, those which will be
in place if the fairness rule based on the eﬀort-luck perception fails.
Policy and equilibrium. Even though the modeling of individual prefer-
ences assumes a prominent role, the decisions concerning the optimal level of
redistribution, i.e., government preference, only takes into consideration the
proﬁle of the median voter.
Deﬁnition: An equilibrium is represented by a τ rate and a collection of
individual plans {ki,ei}i⊂[0,1], such that (a) plan (ki,ei) maximizes the utility
of individual i ∀i, and; (b) the τ rate maximizes the utility of the median
agent.
Due to the quasi-linearity of (3.4), ui − ¯ u = ci − ¯ c, where ¯ c is the average
consumption, will be:
¯ ci = ¯ yi = ¯ Ai[α¯ ki + (1 − α)¯ ei]. [3.6]
Since ¯ c is a constant Ω2 = var(ci), where var denotes the population
variance of cross-sectional data. Considering (3.2), (3.6) Ω2 = (1−τ)2var(yi).
13Note that, under this new structure, the signal-noise ratio found in AA does
not hold. If the single objective of the government is to minimize unfairness,
the optimal rate will equal 1.
In addition, we deﬁne δ ≡ A2
iβi, σ2
¯ η ≡ var(yi) and ∆ ≡ ¯ δ−δm ≥ 0, where ¯ δ
and δm are the mean and median of δ. Thus, the economy is parameterized by
E ≡ (∆,γ,α,φ,σ¯ η). Parameters ∆ and γ support the redistributive policies.
σ¯ η will be the fairness rule and ∆ will be the “selﬁsh” redistribution, i.e., that
which redistributes from the mean i to the median i.
One should highlight that the optimal redistributive policy is only ad-
justed in the middle of individuals’ lives. Until then an (ex ante) rate, τe,
is in force. Hence, the agents will accumulate capital under the ex-ante rate
regime and will choose their eﬀort levels under the optimal regime, i.e.:
ki = (1 − τe)βiAi e ei = (1 − τ)βiAi. [3.7]
Note that there exists an inverse relation between the ex ante and ex
post rates and the levels of physical and human capital accumulation. In the
model of AA, high rates interfere with the fair income level, that is, that
which originates from eﬀort and talent alone.
Optimal policy. The choice of the optimal rate depends on the maximiza-
tion of the utility function of the median voter which, after some simpliﬁca-
tions, is given by:















The ﬁrst and second terms of equation (3.8) represent welfare losses as-
sociated, respectively, with capital accumulation in the ﬁrst period and with
the eﬀort made in the second period. The third term denotes the redistribu-
tion from the median to the mean individual, as described in the model of
Meltzer & Richard (1981). Finally, the fourth term represents the altruism
of society, under φ = 0.








−τ[1 − ατe − (1 − α)τ]∆
o
. [3.9]
i) If γ = 0, then f = 0 if ∆ = 0 and; f > 0, with ∂f/∂∆ > 0 > ∂f/∂τe, if
∆ > 0.
14ii) If γ > 0, then, f > 0 e ∂f/∂σ¯ η > 0, indicating that there is a ˆ τe > 0,
which gives ∂f/∂∆ > 0 if and only if τe < ˆ τe, where the ˆ τe threshold is
increasing in γσ2
¯ η.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is the following: a) if there is neither social
demand for justice (γ = 0) nor any diﬀerence between the mean and median
distribution (∆ = 0), the optimal policy will be equal to zero; b) if the
median voter is poorer than the mean one (∆ > 0), the optimal rate will be
positive and increasing in ∆. In this case, the only decision factor concernsthe
asymmetry of the distribution, as pointed out in Meltzer & Richard (1981)
and; c) in the presence of demand for justice (γ > 0), there will be further
redistribution the stronger the belief that the level of opportunities is not
the same for everyone. That is, (3.9) will always be increasing in σ¯ η and
increasing in ∆, if τ < ˆ τ, and decreasing otherwise.
As occurs in AA, in equilibrium, it is expected that τe = τ, which will
then match the ﬁxed point of f. As underlined earlier, if there is no demand
for justice, the optimal rate will depend on the asymmetry between the mean
and median voters. As the function contains two areas, an increasing and a
decreasing one, in ∆, the equilibrium is expected to be unique. If γ  = 0, the
function will always be increasing in the fairness rule, which also indicates
unique equilibrium. This is so because, unlike the function of AA, (3.9) is
quadratic and strictly convex. This behavior can be seen in Figure 2, where
(3.9) is parameterized with α = 0,5, ∆ = 1, γ = 1 and σ¯ η = 1.
Theorem 1: There is always some equilibrium, which is determined by a
ﬁxed point of f, and f is deﬁned in (3.9). If γ ≥ 0, the equilibrium will
be unique. The τ ∈ [0,1) rate will be increasing in σ¯ η. The f will also be
increasing in ∆, if τ < ˆ τ.
The equilibrium relationship is shown in Figure 3. Note that there is
an inverse relationship between the ex ante and ex post rates. The re-
sulting straight line intersects the 45o line (dotted line) in one point only.
By analyzing this equilibrium (τ = 0,66), one sees that it is stable, as
f′(τ = 0,66) = −0,03 ∈ (−1,1). Note that the resulting τ is close to
the European equilibrium in the model of AA, but at a slightly lower level.
Therefore, it may be concluded that the demand for justice, based on inequal-
ity as a whole and not on its composition, leads Latin American economies























Figure 2: Values for the W(τ,τe).
































Figure 3: Ex Ante and Ex Post.
4 Comments
Unlike the model of AA, the theoretical structure developed in this paper
is characterized by a unique equilibrium. This means that inequality as a
whole rather than its breakdown into luck or eﬀort (φ = 0) simpliﬁed the
model, with a stable equilibrium characterized by high taxation. As a matter
of fact, this equilibrium is determined by two factors, one associated with the
demand for justice and one with selﬁsh redistribution a la Meltzer & Richard
(1981).
In this respect, in order to understand the choice of a high level of tax-
ation, it is necessary to determine the characteristics that aﬀect parameters
γ and ∆ in these societies. According to Alesina et al. (2001), the diﬀerent
behaviors of redistributive policies can be mainly explained by economic and
political factors.
Economically, the variables of interest are static and dynamic inequalities
(level and mobility, respectively). As to income inequality, World Bank doc-
uments (World Bank, 2011) reveal that Latin America and the Caribbean
have the largest income inequality across all continents. Just to have an idea,
the median value for the Gini coeﬃcient of these countries, 0.52, is almost
62% higher than the median value for OECD countries, 0.32.
Besides high rates of inequality, there is low income mobility, both at the
intergenerational and intragenerational levels.12 The evidence provided by
Gottschalk (1997), Birchenall (2001) and Fields (2001) indicates that income
12The intergenerational approach refers to the role of income (schooling) of parents on
their children’s income (schooling). On the other hand, the intragenerational approach
assesses to what extent the income of individuals at time t can interfere in their income
at t + 1.
16mobility in countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Peru is much lower than
that observed in the U.S. and Germany, for example.
The Brazilian case illustrates very well the situation of developing coun-
tries. According to the income transition matrix, described in Figueiredo &
Ziegelmann (2010), the income bracket to which an individual belongs, is a
determining factor for his future social status. For instance, an economic
agent that belongs to the poorest 10% in Brazil is very unlikely to ascend
socially over time to higher income distribution levels.
This scenario favors the greater demand for redistributive policies, either
due to redistributive fairness (γ ≥ 0) or due to the lack of future perspectives
of individuals. That is, redistributive policies are directly related to inequal-
ity and inversely associated with mobility.13 Seemingly, the political factors
mentioned at the beginning of Section 2 also contribute to the higher demand
for social protection. In sum, the behavior of economic and political variables
is consistent with the equilibrium observed in Section 3. That is, developing
countries tend to demand higher levels of taxation and redistribution.
5 Final Remarks
The aim of this paper was to develop a theoretical model to explain the
size of Latin American governments from the perspective of redistributive
policies. The paper was initially motivated by the fact that the theoretical
model developed by AA did not match the reality of these countries. In other
words, unlike developed countries, Latin American societies do not have a
well-established view about the role of merit in economic outcome.
The suggested model proposed a fairness rule based on the perception of
inequality as a whole. The new parameterization generalizes the results of
AA, capturing the behavior of countries with other fairness rules. The results
indicated a unique and stable equilibrium, characterized by high taxation,
outrivaled only by the European welfare state policies.




World Values Survey: This survey is conducted by the Institute for Social
Research at the University of Michigan. The years 1995 and 2007 were used
for data. The variable of interest is the percentage of people who believe that
luck determines income. This information is obtained from a scale coded 1 to
10, where 1 stands for total agreement with the statement: “In the long run,
hard work usually brings a better life.” Conversely, 10 corresponds to the
following statement: “Hard work doesn’t generally bring success. It’s more
a matter of luck and connections.” Based on that, a dummy variable was
developed, which is equal to 1 if an individual has scores greater than or equal
to 6. The remaining covariates of Table 1 can also be found in the survey.
Further details are available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.
LatinoBarómetro: It is a non-proﬁt, privately-owned organization based
in Santiago, Chile. The aim of the survey, conducted since 1995, is to obtain
similar information to that of the World Values Survey but focused on Latin
American countries. This survey included information about Argentina, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela
for years 2000 and 2007. All variables used in Subsection 2 can be easily ob-
tained at: http://www.latinobarometro.org. The dependent variable of
Table 3, political orientation, was built upon the following question: “In po-
litical matters, people talk of left and right.” On a scale where 0 means left
and 10 means right, how would you place your views ?” Those who answered
with a score of 4 or below were given value 1.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Deﬁne W(τ,τe) = (1 − ατ2
e) − Um, where Um is the utility function of the
median voter (with ηm = 0 and ∆ = ¯ δ − δm, with δm = 2), thus:
W(τ,τe) = (1 − α)τ
2 + γ[(1 − τ)
2σ
2
¯ η] − τ[1 − ατe − (1 − α)τ]∆.




= 2(1 − α)τ − 2γ(1 − τ)σ
2
¯ η − [1 − ατe − 2(1 − α)τ]∆;
18∂2W(τ,τe)
∂τ2 = 2(1 − α) + 2γσ
2
¯ η + 2∆(1 − α).
Note that
∂2W(τ,τe)
∂τ2 > 0, i.e., the function is strictly convex. Therefore,
deﬁning H(τ,τe) =
∂W(τ,τe)
∂τ e f(τe) = argmimτ⊂[0,1]W(τ,τe), ne can say that
the ﬁrst-order condition H(τ,τe) = 0 is necessary and suﬃcient such that the
optimal rate τ = f(τe) is unique.
If γ = ∆ = 0, then f(τe) = 0,∀τe ∈ [0,1]. If γ > 0 and/or ∆ > 0,
H(0,τe) > 0,∀τe ∈ [0,1], i.e., f(τe) > 0,∀τe ∈ [0,1]. If γ = 0 and ∆ > 0,
the ﬁrst-order condition f(τe) = (1−ατe)∆/2τ(1−α)[1+∆], indicates that
f(τe) is increasing in ∆ and decreasing in τe.
If γ > 0, then, ∂f/∂σ¯ η = γ(1 − τ)2 and ∂f/∂∆ = −1 + ατe + 2τ(1 − α).





That is, a threshold is established for the eﬀect of ∆ sobre f(τe): ˆ τ =
(1 − ατe)/2(1 − α). By assessing expression H((1 − ατe)/(1 − α),τe), it
should be noted that ˆ τ is decreasing in γσ¯ η. ￿
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Since f is continuous and limited, there will certainly be at least one ﬁxed
point. If τe = τ = 1, then ∂W/∂τ = (1 − α)(2 + ∆). For ∆ ≥ 0, f(1) < 1
if and only if α < 1. Hence, α < 1 ascertains that equilibrium τ = 1 is not
a ﬁxed point. Lemma 1 establishes that f is non-decreasing when γ = 0 or
α = 0. So, it follows that f has a single ﬁxed point when γ = 0 or α = 0. For
the sake of continuity, this result is reserved for values of γ and α that are
quite close to zero. When γ and α yield values suﬃciently greater than zero,
the function f will have an increasing and a decreasing area, indicating the
existence of a ﬁxed point. An example of this equilibrium, when α = 0,5,
∆ = 1, γ = 1 and σ¯ η = 1, is shown in Figures 2 and 3. First, we have the
function W(τ,τe). The second illustration plots the relationship between the
ex-ante rate and the current rate. Note that the inverse relationship has only
one stable equilibrium. ￿
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